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ELIMINATION OF THE OSWIN V. SHAW  SERIOUS LIFE 
IMPACT REQUIREMENT: A SERIOUS IMPACT ON THE 
FUTURE OF NEW JERSEY’S NO-FAULT  
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
Holly R. Blanchard∗
I. INTRODUCTION 
Catherine Norris was involved in a car accident, rear-ended by 
Cecilia Altamar on December 4, 2001.1  As a result, Ms. Norris suf-
fered a small disc herniation in her lower vertebrae, causing her to 
experience back pain and occasional numbness in her right leg.2  
While she was compensated for specific damages through the stan-
dard automobile insurance claims process, she sought to bring suit 
for the recovery of non-economic damages she had suffered as a re-
sult of her injuries.3
However, when Ms. Norris purchased her no-fault automobile 
insurance policy,4 she selected the verbal threshold tort option.5  Ms. 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2003, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania.  I would like to thank my parents, Michael and Nadine Blanch-
ard, for their love and support throughout my law school career.  I would also like to 
express my gratitude to A.J. La Rosa, for his caring and patience.  Finally, this Com-
ment would not have been successfully completed without the invaluable assistance I 
received from Professor Howard Erichson. 
 1 Norris v. Altamar, No. L-117-03, 2005 WL 2585469, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Oct. 14, 2005). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 "No-fault insurance" describes an automobile insurance scheme that requires 
all drivers to carry insurance providing coverage up to policy limits for their own 
damages, regardless of who is at fault in an accident.  In addition, no-fault insurance 
places restrictions on the policyholders’ ability to sue other drivers for non-economic 
damages.  A “pure” no-fault system would completely bar policyholders from suing 
other drivers for damages.  However, no state uses a pure system.  Instead, states that 
implement a no-fault scheme use a combination of the no-fault system and standard 
liability insurance, called “real” no-fault insurance.  See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, 
INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 724–29 (4th ed., Foundation 
Press 2005) (presenting a basic yet comprehensive overview of the underpinnings 
and development of no-fault automobile insurance). 
 5 Id. 
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Norris enjoyed lower premiums as a result of her selection, but the 
quid pro quo was the restriction on her ability to sue for non-economic 
damages arising from injuries sustained in an automobile accident.6  
The New Jersey statute governing the verbal threshold option allows 
only those people to bring suit whose injuries fall under one of the 
statutorily defined categories of injury.7  Additionally, at the time of 
Ms. Norris’s claim and for nine years prior, judicial interpretation of 
the same statute had imposed an additional requirement on prospec-
tive plaintiffs—the injury must also have a serious impact on the 
plaintiff and her life.8  At trial, Ms. Norris failed to show that her non-
economic injuries had a serious impact on her life, despite being 
permanent in nature; as a result, her case was dismissed on summary 
judgment.9
Ms. Norris appealed the trial judge’s decision, and while her ap-
peal was pending, the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down a de-
cision in DiProspero v. Penn10 rendering the serious life impact re-
quirement null and void in suits for non-economic damages, such as 
those claimed by Ms. Norris.11  Her case can now proceed at trial, and 
given that she has already established the permanent nature of her 
injuries and no longer has to demonstrate a serious life impact, she 
will likely withstand the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 
This is just one example of many appeals on New Jersey’s dock-
ets currently awaiting the retroactive application of DiProspero.12  
DiProspero has opened the door to appeals and new suits similar to 
that of Ms. Norris.13  Presently, automobile accident victims who have 
 6 Id. 
 7 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(a) (West 2002). 
 8 See Oswin v. Shaw, 609 A.2d 415 (N.J. 1992). 
 9 Norris v. Altamar, No. L-117-03, 2005 WL 2585469, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Oct. 14, 2005). 
 10 874 A.2d 1039 (N.J. 2005). 
 11 See  id. 
 12 The decision in DiProspero has been granted “pipeline” retroactivity for appeals.  
See Beltran v. DeLima, 877 A.2d 307, 310 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
 13 See, e.g., Fithen v. Johnson, No. L-1353-03, 2005 WL 3299165 (N.J. Su-
per. App. Div. Dec. 7, 2005); Klitsch v. Gilbert, No. BUR-L-3643-02, 2005 WL 
3242322 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Dec. 2, 2005); Sandrow v. Mastrullo, No. L-
3307-02, 2005 WL 3196574 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 30, 2005); Mattia v. 
Capone, No. ESX-L-10932-02, 2005 WL 3158058 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 
29, 2005); Rodriguez v. Hopewell, No. L-3864-02, 2005 WL 3115819 (N.J. 
Super. App. Div. Nov. 23, 2005), Davis v. Gaspari, No. L-1688-03, 2005 WL 
3071576 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 17, 2005), Immordino v. Romano, No. 
MER-L-3338-02, 2005 WL 3050612 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 16, 2005), 
Carroll v. Buchanan, No. L-2106-03, 2005 WL 3040770 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 
Nov. 15, 2005), Youssef v. Procopio, No. L-4112-03, 2005 WL 2923570 (N.J. 
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selected the verbal threshold tort option in their no-fault automobile 
insurance policies can bring suit for pain and suffering under a sig-
nificantly less stringent standard.14  According to the insurance indus-
try, requiring only that plaintiffs sustain a permanent injury, and not 
an injury that has a serious impact on their lives, leads to a substantial 
increase in automobile insurance premiums for policyholders select-
ing this option because the price of litigation and likely settlement 
costs will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher premi-
ums.15
Previously, Ms. Norris’s claim would have been dismissed on 
summary judgment because of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1992 
decision in Oswin v. Shaw.16  In Oswin, the court held that for plain-
tiffs selecting the verbal threshold in their no-fault automobile insur-
ance policy to sue for pain and suffering, they must demonstrate not 
only that their injuries fit into one of the nine statutorily defined 
categories of injury, but also that the injury alleged had a “serious 
impact on the plaintiff and her life.”17  Oswin dealt with the interpre-
tation of the statute introducing the verbal threshold to New Jersey 
insurance law (“the 1988 Act”).18  The 1988 Act allowed policyholders 
a choice of either the verbal threshold tort option or a no threshold 
option; the latter was available for a much higher premium, but in re-
turn gave the policyholder the opportunity to sue for non-economic 
damages arising from any injury, and not just those defined in the 
statute.19  Plaintiffs who selected the verbal threshold option enjoyed 
Super. App. Div. Nov. 7, 2005), Harrison v. Lora, No. L-1139-02, 2005 WL 
2848184 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 1, 2005). 
 14 See discussion infra Part VI. 
 15 See Industry Fears 'Serious Impact' on Auto Market of N.J. Court Ruling, INSURANCE 
JOURNAL, July 4, 2005, http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/east/ 
2005/07/04/features/57616.htm.  According to Pinnacle Actuarial Resources, an 
actuarial consulting firm serving the automobile insurance industry, the increases in 
bodily injury, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage costs that might result 
from the decision in DiProspero for drivers selecting the verbal threshold option in 
their no-fault insurance policies are between thirty-four and fifty-seven percent, or 
“approximately $98 to $163 annually per car.”  Id.  New Jersey is already in a particu-
larly perilous situation for rate increases, given that the average expenditure for pri-
vate passenger automobile insurance has consistently been the highest in the nation.  
Historically, New Jersey has paid up to four times the national average in dividends to 
policyholders, and at times that figure has reached six times the national average.  See 
Insurance Information Institute: Facts and Statistics, http://www.iii.org/media/ 
facts/statsbyissue/auto. (last visited September 9, 2006). 
 16 609 A.2d 415 (N.J. 1992). 
 17 Oswin v. Shaw, 595 A.2d 522, 527 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
 18 Id. at 523. 
 19 See CYNTHIA M. CRAIG & DANIEL J. POMEROY, NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
LAW 13 (Gann Law Books 2004) (1998).  This was the first time that the more restric-
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significantly lower premiums, but were restricted in their right to sue 
for general damages; in order to bring suit, they had to show that 
their injuries fell within one of the nine statutorily defined catego-
ries.20  In reaching its decision, the court relied on the legislature’s 
intent to “close[] the courthouse door to all lawsuits except those in-
volving bona fide serious injuries . . . [and] maintain[] the substantial 
benefits of no-fault [insurance] at an affordable price.”21
The New Jersey Supreme Court in DiProspero22 significantly al-
tered the requirements to bring suit.23  Now, appeals and claims for 
non-economic damages like Ms. Norris’s would survive a motion for 
summary judgment and proceed to trial.  In DiProspero, the court con-
sidered whether the “serious life impact” standard set in Oswin car-
ried forward to claims brought following the passage in 1998 of the 
Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA) which amended 
the 1988 Act.24  The court held that Oswin’s “serious life impact” stan-
tive tort option became the default option.  Prior to the passage of the 1988 Act, a 
policyholder who did not elect otherwise became subject to the $200 monetary 
threshold, instead of the $1500 threshold, which offered lower premiums. Id.  Fol-
lowing the passage of the 1988 Act, “all insureds were made subject to the verbal 
threshold unless they affirmatively elected otherwise on a coverage selection form.”  
Id. 
 20 See 1988 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 119 (West) (current version at N.J. STAT. Ann. § 
39:6A-8(a) (2003)): 
 
Tort exemption; limitation on the right to noneconomic loss: 
 
Every owner, registrant, operator or occupant of an automobile to 
which . . . personal injury protection coverage, regardless of fault, ap-
plies . . . is hereby exempted from tort liability for noneconomic loss to 
a person who is subject to this subsection . . . unless that person has 
sustained a personal injury which results in death; dismemberment; signifi-
cant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss of use of a body or-
gan, member, function or system; permanent consequential limitation of use of a 
body organ or member; significant limitation of use of a body function or system; 
or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature 
which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the mate-
rial acts which constitute that person's usual and customary daily activities for 
not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the occurrence 
of the injury or impairment. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 21 Oswin, 595 A.2d at 524 (citing Governor’s Reconsideration and Recommenda-
tion Statement to Senate, No. 2637-L.1998. c. 119, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.4). 
 22 DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 1039 (N.J. 2005). 
 23 See discussion infra Part V. 
 24 DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1047–49.  The court had previously denied certification 
on this issue.  See James v. Torres, 808 A.2d 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002), cert. 
denied, 816 A.2d 1049 (N.J. 2003). 
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dard did not survive AICRA.25  The court argued, among other rea-
sons, that AICRA represented a complete overhaul of New Jersey’s 
automobile insurance statute and therefore Oswin’s interpretation is 
not applicable to AICRA.26  Following DiProspero, for plaintiffs to 
bring suit for non-economic damages under the verbal threshold 
(now termed the “limitation on lawsuit”) option,27 they must demon-
strate only that their injuries fit into one of the six statutorily defined 
categories,28 rendering irrelevant in verbal threshold cases the impact 
on damage calculations, if any, that the injury had on the plaintiff’s 
life. 
Had the proverbial slate upon which AICRA was drafted been 
wiped clean at the time of its creation, it would indeed be difficult to 
argue that the “serious life impact” prong had survived the amend-
ments to the 1988 Act.  However, AICRA was not written upon a 
blank slate.  This Comment will argue that under an examination of 
the strong legislative intent powering the evolution of New Jersey 
automobile insurance law to its present form, the precedential value 
of the Oswin decision, the reasoning of cases heard prior to DiProspero 
in the New Jersey Appellate Division supporting the “serious life im-
pact” prong, and AICRA’s shortcomings, it is clear that the DiProspero 
court was incorrect in rejecting Oswin’s “serious life impact” require-
 25 See discussion infra Part V. 
 26 DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1046. 
 27 While now officially termed the “limitation on lawsuit” option (see N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 39:6A-8(1)), it is popularly referred to in practice by its old name, the “verbal 
threshold.”  CRAIG & POMEROY, supra note 19, at 13.  The verbal threshold is called 
that because the subsection of the statute in which it is found is intended to define 
the nature of the injury that a plaintiff must suffer in order to bring suit.  Essentially, 
the plaintiff’s injuries must fall under one of the statutory definitions.  See N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 39:6A-8(1) (West 2005). 
 28 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(1) (West 2005): 
 
Tort exemption; limitation on the right to noneconomic loss: 
 
Every owner, registrant, operator or occupant of an automobile to 
which . . . personal injury protection . . . regardless of fault, applies . . . 
is hereby exempted from tort liability for noneconomic loss to a person 
who is subject to this subsection . . . unless that person has sustained a 
bodily injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigure-
ment or significant scarring; displaced fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent 
injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or 
disfigurement. An injury shall be considered permanent when the body 
part or organ, or both, has not healed to function normally and will 
not heal to function normally with further medical treatment. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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ment.29  Ultimately, while AICRA did amend the 1988 Act, the thrust 
behind the 1988 Act had remained in place up to and beyond the 
time of AICRA’s passage; thus, refusing to carry forth the Oswin stan-
dard would not only be bad policy, but it would ignore the legislative 
intent behind AICRA and its predecessors. 
This Comment begins with a presentation of the history of New 
Jersey automobile insurance statutes.  It will introduce the lengthy yet 
important history to highlight the Legislature’s continuing intent to 
draft a law allowing for recovery of a plaintiff’s losses while maintain-
ing reasonable no-fault premiums.  Part II will also discuss the devel-
opment of the verbal threshold, the underlying topic of this paper.  
Part III of the Comment will provide an analysis of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s decision in Oswin v. Shaw, the case which inter-
preted AICRA’s predecessor to include a “serious life impact” re-
quirement.  Part IV introduces and provides a detailed explanation of 
AICRA, and offers a comparison to its predecessor, the 1988 Act.  
Part V presents the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in DiProspero 
v. Penn, which eliminated the earlier “serious life impact” require-
ment imposed in Oswin.  Part VI rebuts the court’s decision in DiPros-
pero and argues that Oswin’s “serious life impact” standard should be 
retained based on the role of legislative intent in the creation of 
AICRA, prior judicial construction of issue, and a critical examination 
of AICRA. 
II. HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE STATUTES 
New Jersey’s history with automobile insurance legislation high-
lights the state’s ongoing attempts to balance the policyholder’s right 
to recover for losses incurred as a result of bodily injury against main-
taining reasonable and affordable premiums.30  In 1972, the Legisla-
 29 Recently proposed amendments, which move to instate the Oswin “serious life 
impact” requirement for suits brought post-AICRA, left the issue for the Legislature 
to clarify for the courts the meaning and correct interpretation of this statute.  See, 
e.g., Assemb. B. 4381, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004); Assemb. B. 4227, 211th Leg. (N.J. 
2004); S.B. 2688, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004); S.B. 2705, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004); available 
at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillsByNumber.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2006). 
 30 Prior to 1929, no legislation in New Jersey had been written to address the fi-
nancial responsibilities of drivers in automobile accidents causing either bodily injury 
or property damage.  CRAIG & POMEROY, supra note 19, at 2.  Between 1929 and 1952, 
only those individuals who had committed certain specified offenses had to prove 
that they had the financial ability to respond to any claim for either injury or prop-
erty damage in an accident.  Id.  With the passage of the Motor Vehicle Security-
Responsibility Law of 1952, New Jersey expanded the number of people who had to 
demonstrate proof of financial ability to respond to claims by injured parties.  Id. at 
3.  Specifically, it required any person involved in an accident resulting in $100 or 
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ture adopted the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act, 
known in short as the “No Fault Act,”31 which signified the switch to 
compulsory no-fault insurance from a voluntary insurance scheme for 
personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits for all drivers registered in 
the state of New Jersey.32  The effect was that “all insurance policies 
written for private passenger vehicles were required to provide enu-
merated personal injury protection benefits to certain classes of per-
sons without regard to who was at fault in the accident.”33  PIP benefits 
included medical-expense benefits, income continuation benefits, es-
sential-services benefits, death benefits, and funeral expenses benefits 
payable to an insured and members of the insured’s family who sus-
tained bodily injury or death as a result of an automobile accident, 
without regard to the fault of the insured.34  While the default option 
was the limitation on lawsuit option, drivers were ultimately given an 
option to remain with the default choice or to retain their right to 
sue for any injury.35  The No Fault Act implemented a monetary 
threshold, in contrast to a verbal threshold, of $200 for the recovery 
of non-economic loss for bodily injury and resultant medical ex-
penses.36  The monetary threshold meant that plaintiffs would only be 
able to bring suit for non-economic damages if it was proven that 
their medical expenses had exceeded $200.37
more in damages to post a security fixed by the Department of Motor Vehicles unless 
that person had separate liability insurance.  Id.  New Jersey had a voluntary insur-
ance scheme in place until 1972; however, it shifted to a compulsory no-fault insur-
ance scheme in 1972 when it became clear that a voluntary insurance scheme failed 
to provide adequate protection to automobile accident victims.  Id. at 10.  Similarly, 
the voluntary scheme imposed an enormous financial burden on the state through 
the number of claims being made through the Uncompensated Claim and Judgment 
Fund, which provided a measure of relief to persons sustaining losses in automobile 
accidents caused by uninsured or financially unstable motorists.  Id. 
 31 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1 to -18 (effective Jan. 1. 1973). 
 32 CRAIG & POMEROY, supra note 19, at 10.  The Act also made uninsured motorist 
coverage mandatory.  Id.  Additionally, the No Fault Act implemented protective 
measures in hopes of containing rising rates which had been shown in part to result 
from fraudulent claims; for example, penalties were assessed to persons making false 
or fraudulent claims.  Id. at 9. 
 33 Id. (emphasis added). 
 34 N.J. Coal. of Health Care Prof’ls, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking and Ins., 732 
A.2d 1063, 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
 35 CRAIG & POMEROY, supra note 19, at 203. 
 36 Id. at 202. 
 37 “The section barred civil suits for damages ‘if the bodily injury is confined 
solely to the soft tissue of the body and if the medical expenses incurred or to be in-
curred by such injured person for the reasonable and necessary treatment of such 
bodily injury, is, less than $200.00, exclusive of hospital expenses, x-rays, and other 
diagnostic medical expenses.’”  CYNTHIA M. CRAIG & DANIEL J. POMEROY, NEW JERSEY 
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LAW 242 (Gann Law Books 2004) (2004). 
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In another effort to lower the rising costs of PIP premiums, the 
Legislature amended the No Fault Act in 1983 with the New Jersey 
Automobile Insurance Freedom of Choice and Cost Containment 
Act, providing policyholders the option to elect a higher monetary 
threshold of $1500 instead of the previous $200 threshold in return 
for lower premiums.38  The $200 amount remained the default policy 
selection.39  The increase in the monetary threshold was a response to 
the scenario that had become all too common to the courts: “[E]very 
torts lawyer in the state[] soon recognized that it would be easy to in-
flate damages above the $200 threshold level—and hence to enable a 
torts suit—by increasing the cost of medical treatments.”40  However, even 
the $1,500 threshold did not prove to be a barrier to suits as claim-
ants found it nearly as easy to circumvent the $1500 threshold as they 
did the $200 threshold.  Between 1980 and 1988, the “severity” of 
claims had doubled: claims for bodily injury had risen from $7592 to 
$14,484,41 easily enabling a plaintiff to vault the threshold, either arti-
ficially or legitimately, and bring suit. 
In 1988, the Legislature replaced the monetary threshold with a 
verbal threshold in response to the ease of manipulation of the 
monetary threshold.42  This reformulation of the tort threshold was a 
direct response to the shortcomings of prior law.  “The statute was a 
pragmatic accommodation provoked by the spiraling costs and de-
creasing availability of automobile insurance, congestion in the 
courts, and the conviction of many that the judicial system should not 
give audience to minor automobile injury claims.”43  The verbal 
threshold is intended to define the nature of the injury that a plain-
 38 Id. at 42. 
 39 See supra note 19 (explaining that $200 was the default policy selection). 
 40 See Howard M. Latin, No Fault: To Be or Not To Be? When Drivers Sue Drivers: Ex-
posing the Myths Underlying Automobile Litigation, 166 N.J. LAW. Jan. 1995 at 24 (empha-
sis added).  See also John D. Worrall, Private Passenger Auto Insurance in New Jersey: A 
Three-Decade Advertisement for Reform, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE: 
RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 106 (J. David Cummins 
ed., 2002) (noting “[i]t was a simple matter to exceed the [$200] lawsuit threshold”).  
The 1972 Act’s $200 threshold had been eroded by the inflation of the price of 
medical services so as to reduce it to $77.62 in real figures.  Id.  The Legislature, in 
implementing the $1,500 threshold found that the numbers of suits were not being 
reduced as it had hoped; the $200 threshold had failed because the amount was sim-
ply too little when considered in light of medical expenses even without their artifi-
cial inflation.  Id. 
 41 See Worrall, supra note 40, at 110.  By 1988, because the costs of medical care 
had been continuously inflated, the $200 monetary threshold originally introduced 
in 1972 had been whittled down to only $56 by 1983.  Id. 
 42 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8, 8.1 (effective Jan. 1, 1989). 
 43 Oswin v. Shaw, 595 A.2d 522, 523 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
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tiff must suffer, instead of the amount of medical bills incurred, in 
order to maintain a suit for non-economic loss.44  Thus, the more re-
strictive tort option became the default tort option, applicable to all 
policyholders except those who elected otherwise, unlike the 1983 
Act which set the less restrictive $200 threshold as the default.45  Simi-
lar, however, to the earlier version of the Act, policyholders still re-
tained the option to select a zero-threshold policy that, while having 
much higher premiums, allowed the insured to retain the right to sue 
for non-economic loss resulting from any injury.46
III. OSWIN V. SHAW: THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT’S 
INTERPRETATION OF THE 1988 ACT 
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Oswin faced the issue of 
whether plaintiff’s injuries were sufficient to vault the 1988 version of 
the verbal threshold and thus maintain a suit for non-permanent in-
juries.47  Plaintiff’s injuries were alleged to fall under either category 
seven (“permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or 
member”) or category eight (“significant limitation of use of a body 
function or system”).48  The New Jersey Appellate Division, later af-
firmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, concluded that the test for 
whether a plaintiff’s injuries have vaulted the verbal threshold did not 
depend merely on the plaintiff’s treating physician’s assertions that 
the injuries suffered fit within one of the categories; instead, the 
court stated that the real test is “whether the injury has a serious im-
pact on the plaintiff and her life.”49
 44 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 45 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 46 The verbal threshold option has been by far the most popular choice among 
policyholders in New Jersey.  Approximately three years after it was introduced, “85% 
of the population ha[d] opted for the lower cost ‘verbal threshold’ over the higher 
cost ‘no threshold’ option.”  Oswin, 595 A.2d at 524.  But see Worrall, supra note 40, at 
104 (highlighting that while no-fault is the most popular option in New Jersey, se-
lected by nearly ninety percent of the insureds in the state, this “popularity” may just 
be a framing effect because no-fault is the default choice for policyholders in the 
state). 
 47 Oswin v. Shaw, 609 A.2d 415, 416 (N.J. 1992). 
 48 Id. at 427. 
 49 Oswin v. Shaw, 595 A.2d. 522, 527 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), aff’d 609 
A.2d 415 (N.J. 1992).  The New Jersey Supreme Court later declared that a “[signifi-
cant] limitation of use of a body function or system should be construed to mean 
something more than a minor limitation of use.  We believe that a minor, mild, or 
slight limitation of use should be classified as insignificant within the meaning of the 
statute.”  Oswin, 609 A.2d at 428 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Licari v. El-
liot, 441 N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (N.Y. 1982)). 
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In arriving at the “serious life impact” requirement, the New Jer-
sey Appellate Division ultimately looked to the interpretation of New 
York’s similar no-fault automobile insurance statute for guidance, 
noting that the New Jersey Legislature specifically and expressly in-
tended the 1988 Act to be patterned after the New York state law.50  
The Governor’s Reconsideration and Recommendation Statement 
issued prior to the production of the 1988 Act’s final version pro-
vided the court with “strong evidence of [the] legislative intent” not 
only behind the switch to a verbal threshold over a monetary thresh-
old, but also behind the objective to construe the New Jersey statute 
in a manner consistent with the current interpretation of the New 
York statute.51  Regarding the switch from a monetary to a verbal 
threshold, then Governor Kean stated: 
[The better] compromise is to make the verbal threshold the ba-
sic liability coverage in every automobile insurance policy the law 
of the land in New Jersey [while allowing] . . . individual insureds 
 . . . to opt for a monetary threshold, at a higher cost . . . .  I rec-
ommend adoption of a zero dollar threshold option [that] will al-
low individuals to opt into a pure fault liability system, a choice 
which will be reflected in their higher premiums.  The purpose of 
the zero dollar [verbal threshold] option is to remove the incen-
tive to inflate medical bills—thereby placing an unnecessary bur-
den on PIP coverage—in order to reach some specified monetary 
threshold.  I believe the citizens of New Jersey recognize that 
when their medical bills are being promptly paid, without regard 
to fault, they lose next to nothing in relinquishing the ability to 
sue for pain and suffering for nonserious injuries only and, con-
sequently, the vast majority will maintain the base verbal thresh-
old.52
Concerning the similarities between New Jersey’s proposed law 
and New York’s current law, the Reconsideration and Recommenda-
tion Statement expressly stated: 
The verbal threshold contained in this recommendation is pat-
terned after that in force in New York State.  [New York’s] verbal 
threshold specifically sets forth those injuries which will be con-
sidered “serious.” Lawsuits for non-economic injuries, such as 
pain and suffering, will be allowed for these enumerated “serious 
injuries” only.  It is my intention that the term “serious injury,” as 
defined in this recommendation, shall be construed in a manner 
that is consistent with the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in 
 50 Oswin, 595 A.2d at 524. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 523–24. 
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Licari v. Elliot. Whether a plaintiff has sustained a “serious injury” 
must be decided by the court, and not the jury.  Otherwise, the 
bill’s essential purpose of closing the courthouse door to all lawsuits except 
those involving bona fide serious injuries will be diluted and the bill’s 
effectiveness will be greatly diminished.  In addition, strict con-
struction of the verbal threshold is essential; any judicial relaxa-
tion of this plain language will impede the intent of maintaining 
the substantial benefits of no-fault at an affordable price.53
Based on this statement of the Legislature’s goal to keep no-fault 
insurance premiums affordable, the court followed the language pre-
sent in the Governor’s Recommendation, concluding that the 1998 
Act was to be construed in a manner that only permitted plaintiffs 
with a “serious” injury to sue.54  Applying this reasoning to plaintiff’s 
case, the court cited the Licari decision in support of the proposition 
that a significant “‘limitation of use of a body function or system’ 
should be construed to mean something more than a minor limita-
 53 Oswin, 595 A.2d at 524 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).  The Licari deci-
sion’s summarization of the legislative intent behind the changes to the New York 
no-fault scheme mirrors the intent behind the changes made in New Jersey; essen-
tially, New York plaintiffs were similarly padding their medical bills in order to vault 
the monetary threshold, and the Legislature responded with the implementation of 
the verbal threshold.  See generally Licari, 441 N.E.2d 1088.  This was not the only mo-
tive behind the switch to a verbal threshold in New York; like New Jersey, New York’s 
verbal threshold was intended to keep suits for minor, non-serious injuries out of the 
courts, not only to reduce congestion in the courts, but also to further the goal of 
keeping no-fault automobile insurance premiums affordable.  Id. 
 54 The Supreme Court in Oswin recognized that its test might pose some prob-
lems in its application: 
We understand that one might view the “serious impact on plaintiff's 
life” test as somewhat subjective. To ensure uniform application of that 
test, we emphasize that plaintiffs must submit objective, credible evi-
dence that could support a jury finding in his or her favor. We respect 
the abilities of medical professionals to ascertain the presence of a 
genuine, disabling injury, but we nevertheless are satisfied that the Leg-
islature sought to guard against a finding of “serious injury” when 
plaintiff's proofs are based solely on subjective complaints of pain. 
Oswin v. Shaw, 609 A.2d 415, 429 (N.J. 1992) (emphasis omitted). 
The “objective medical evidence” requirement was one part of a three-part re-
quirement for a plaintiff’s injuries to vault the threshold under the sixth, seventh, 
and eight categories of injury.   See Thomas P. Weidner & Michael J. Canavan, The 
“New” Verbal Threshold: But is it Improved?, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 117, 123 (1999).  
The other two requirements were (1) “plaintiff must show a nexus between the injury 
and the disability,” and (2) plaintiff must show a serious life impact.  Id. (quoting 
Oswin, 609 A.2d at 429).  This flows from the Oswin court adopting what has been 
deemed as the “summary judgment plus” standard: essentially, the “question of 
whether an injury is ‘serious’ is a matter for the court to decide, but disputes regard-
ing the nature and extent of the injury will survive summary judgment only if the 
plaintiff has submitted objective medical evidence to support his or her claims.”  Id. 
at 122 (emphasis omitted) (citing Oswin, 609 A.2d at 422). 
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tion of use.  We believe that a minor, mild or slight limitation of use 
should be classified as insignificant within the meaning of the stat-
ute.”55  Because the plaintiff had failed to show that her injuries were 
more than a mild limitation on use, her claim was dismissed on sum-
mary judgment.56
IV. THE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COST REDUCTION ACT 
The Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act57 (AICRA), New 
Jersey’s most recent alteration to its no-fault insurance scheme, was 
enacted in 1998. 58  AICRA was enacted “in order to further limit the 
number of lawsuits filed and thereby reduce premiums for bodily in-
jury coverage.”59  From the time of the passage of the 1988 Act until 
the passage of AICRA, New Jersey had consistently paid the highest or 
near-highest average automobile insurance premiums in the coun-
try.60  AICRA contained numerous provisions aimed at reducing the 
cost of insurance, some with the purpose of addressing the failure of 
the 1988 Act to “stem the tide of lawsuits related to soft tissue inju-
ries,”61 and others hoping to contain the severity of claims that were 
 55 Oswin, 609 A.2d at 428 (quoting Licari, 441 N.E.2d at 1091). 
 56 Oswin, 595 A.2d at 528. 
 57 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (Supp. 2006). 
 58 The need for automobile insurance reform was a prominent campaign issue in 
the pending gubernatorial race between incumbent Governor Christie Whitman and 
her challenger, State Senator James R. McGreevey.  Following Governor Whitman’s 
reelection, the Senate and Assembly created a Joint Committee on Automobile In-
surance Reform that held seven committee meetings and five “deliberations” be-
tween December 16, 1997 and April 2, 1998, addressing the history of the no-fault 
scheme in New Jersey, current areas of the law needing reform, and culminating in 
the drafting of AICRA.  New Jersey State Library, Legislative History Compilations, 
http://www.njstatelib.org/NJLH/LH9899/CHAP21.HTM (last visited Sept. 15, 
2006). 
 59 Sponsor’s Statement to S.B. 3, 208th Leg. (N.J. 1998), 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/9899/Bills/s0500/3_i2.pdf. 
 60 See Randy Diamond, N.J. Car Insurance Rates Again Top Nation, RECORD (Hack-
ensack), Feb. 9, 1995 at A-3; see also supra note 15. 
 61 CRAIG & POMEROY, supra note 19, at 255.  See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1.1 
(West 2002).  The Legislature sought again to address the issue of “padding” of 
plaintiffs’ medical bills; however, their efforts were directed at a slightly different 
area this time.  See discussion infra Part II.  Their concerns regarding the verbal 
threshold no longer centered around the padding of medical bills to vault a mone-
tary threshold; instead, the focus was the rate increases resulting from extremely high 
and inflated payouts for injuries and unnecessary treatment.  Id. 
Whereas, Since the enactment of the verbal threshold in 1988, the sub-
stantial increase in the cost of medical expense benefits indicates that 
the benefits are being overutilized . . . ,thus undermining the limita-
tions imposed by the threshold and necessitating the imposition of fur-
ther controls on the use of those benefits, including the establishment 
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being artificially inflated by limiting the methods of treatment for in-
juries to those specifically approved by the Commissioner of Banking 
and Insurance.62
In response to the difficulty that New Jersey’s lower court had 
had in interpreting the “subjective” categories of injury of the 1988 
Act,63 and the subsequent lack of uniformity in decision making64 re-
garding injuries alleged to fall within these categories, AICRA re-
vamped the disputed categories in the 1988 Act.65  The first three 
categories of death, dismemberment, and loss of a fetus, were carried 
forward without change.66  The Legislature expanded the fourth 
category, significant disfigurement, to include significant scarring.67  
The fifth category, fracture, was reduced in scope to now include only 
displaced fractures.68  The changes made to categories six through 
nine were the most substantial; all four categories were replaced and 
the terms “significant” and “consequential” have been substituted by 
the single qualifier of “permanent.”69  The final qualifying category of 
of a basis for determining whether treatments or diagnostic tests are 
medically necessary. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1.1(b). 
 62 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1.1.  The Commissioner adopted N.J. ADMIN. CODE. 
11:3-4, which established the standard medical procedures and protocols, and pro-
vided a list of certain acceptable and unacceptable diagnostic tests.  See N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE. 11:3-4 (Supp. 2005). 
Specifically, N.J. ADMIN. CODE. 11:3-4.6 establishes medical protocols by 
reference to six care paths which establish standard courses of appro-
priate treatment, including the administration of diagnostic tests, for 
identified injuries stemming from trauma to the neck and back. The 
care paths are not applicable to generally more serious injuries such as 
dismemberment, scarring, fractures, or head and organ injury. As 
noted, these care paths apply only to generally less serious-injuries—
soft tissue injuries—which, in [the] D[epartment] O[f] 
B[anking][and] I[nsurance]'s view, have driven up PIP and liability 
premium costs. 
N.J. Coal. of Health Care Prof’ls, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking and Ins., 732 A.2d 
1063, 1074 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
 63 This refers to prior categories six through nine in the 1988 Act.  See 1988 N.J. 
Sess. Law Serv. 119 (West).  While not numbered in the statute, they are here re-
ferred to by number for ease of reference. 
 64 See James v. Torres, 808 A.2d 873, 876 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) cert. de-
nied, 816 A.2d 1049 (N.J. 2003).(“It would not be an understatement to say that it can 
appear difficult to find an analytical thread unifying subsequent judicial treatment of 
what constitutes a ‘serious impact’ upon a plaintiff's life.”). 
 65 Compare supra notes 20 with 28 (providing the text of both the 1988 Act’s and 
AICRA’s versions of the categories of injury). 
 66 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (West 2002). 
 67 See id. 
 68 See id. 
 69 See id. 
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injury under AICRA now reads “a permanent injury within a reason-
able degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigure-
ment.”70  The statute also defines how the permanence of an injury 
shall be determined: “[a]n injury shall be considered permanent 
when the body part or organ, or both, has not healed to function 
normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical 
treatment.”71
In sum, AICRA aimed to eliminate suits for all non-permanent 
injuries (other than displaced fractures) that were previously viable 
causes of action under the 1988 Act.  AICRA also implemented a phy-
sician certification requirement, requiring that for a plaintiff to satisfy 
the provisions of the statute, he must, within sixty days following the 
date of the answer to the complaint, provide the defendant with a 
certification based on objective medical evidence from his treating 
physician.72  The certification is required to state, under the penalty 
of perjury, that the plaintiff has suffered an injury falling under one 
of the statutorily defined categories.73  Additionally, AICRA created 
the Office of the Fraud Prosecutor, designed to investigate and cur-
tail fraud within the insurance industry.74
V. DIPROSPERO V. PENN: THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT BIDS 
FAREWELL TO OSWIN’S “SERIOUS LIFE IMPACT” REQUIREMENT 
Thirteen years after Oswin and seven years after AICRA’s pas-
sage, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in DiProspero v. Penn, granted 
certification on the issue of whether Oswin’s “serious life impact” re-
quirement was intended to be carried forward to verbal threshold 
claims for non-economic damages brought post-AICRA.75  In DiPros-
pero, a verbal threshold plaintiff sought recovery for non-economic 
damages arising from injuries suffered in an automobile accident 
which included a restricted exercise regimen, inability to eat certain 
hard foods, and back pain.76  Plaintiff’s injuries did not, however, re-
strict her in such a manner that she could not partake in most “nor-
mal” daily activities.77  The New Jersey Law Division, affirmed by the 
 70 See id. 
 71 See id. 
 72 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (West 2005). 
 73 Id. 
 74 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4 (West 2005). 
 75 DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 1039 (N.J. 2005).  The court had previously de-
nied certification on this issue.  See supra note 24. 
 76 DiProspero v. Penn, No. L-7318-01, 2004 WL 439350, at *1–2 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2004). 
 77 Id. at *1. 
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New Jersey Appellate Division, held that plaintiff’s injuries, while suf-
ficient to satisfy the sixth category of injury of AICRA (a permanent 
injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability), were not 
sufficiently serious to allow recovery because AICRA requires a plain-
tiff to demonstrate not only that they have suffered a permanent in-
jury, but also that the injury had a serious impact on plaintiff’s life.78
On certification, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.79  
While the New Jersey Appellate Division, which had addressed this 
same issue twice before in James v. Torres80 and Rios v. Szivos,81 relied 
on the previously expressed legislative intent behind AICRA to reach 
their decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that because the 
language of AICRA is unambiguous and does not expressly include a 
“serious life impact” requirement, there is no need to resort to any 
sort of extrinsic aids, like legislative intent, to determine the correct 
interpretation.82  However, the court realized that it could not “ig-
nore the unique historical background of AICRA and the prior judi-
cial construction of a predecessor statute—the 1988 verbal threshold” 
in its decision.83  To support its holding that the Legislature did not 
intend for Oswin’s “serious life impact” requirement to be carried for-
ward to cases brought post-AICRA, the Court focused on four extrin-
sic aids84 to determine whether they in fact point to an interpretation 
other than that which arises from the clear language of the statute.85
 78 Id. at *3. 
 79 DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1057. 
 80 808 A.2d 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 2002), cert. denied, 816 A.2d 1049 (N.J. 
2003). 
 81 808 A.2d 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
 82 DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1048. 
 83 Id. at 1049. 
 84 The court also considered the significance of Governor Whitman’s conditional 
veto of AICRA.  Id. at 1055.  The Court relied on the fact that Whitman failed to ref-
erence the “serious life impact” requirement in her conditional veto statement 
which, according to the court, “strongly impl[ies] that she did not expect that 
Oswin’s extra-statutory standard would apply to AICRA.”  Id. at 1056.  See generally 
Governor Whitman’s Conditional Veto, http://www.njstatelib.org/NJLH/LH9899/ 
CHAP21.HTM (last visited Jan. 5, 2006). 
 85 DiProspero, 874 A.2d. at 1050.  Specifically, the Court stated: 
To overcome the presumption that the Legislature acted deliberately 
by not incorporating Oswin’s serious life impact standard into AICRA, 
defendants must demonstrate through extrinsic aids that the Legisla-
ture expected that this court would interpret the wholly new limitation 
on lawsuit threshold in the same manner as the discarded 1988 verbal 
threshold. 
Id. 
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The court first looked to basic canons of statutory construction.86  
Defendants had argued that although the Legislature was well aware 
of the construction of the verbal threshold reached in Oswin, that 
construction remained in place for nearly thirteen years without leg-
islative action.  The court rebutted that argument by stating “the Leg-
islature is presumed to be aware of the judicial construction of its en-
actments, and a change in the language in a statute ordinarily implies 
a purposeful alteration in the substance of the law.”87  It bolstered this 
rationale by offering a “selective incorporation” argument; while 
AICRA expressly incorporates one portion of the holding in Oswin, 
the “objective medical evidence” requirement, it fails to include the 
requirement of a “serious life impact.”88  From this, the court con-
cluded that this sort of selective incorporation “strongly implies that 
[the Legislature] consciously chose not to incorporate” the “serious 
life impact” requirement.89
Next, the court turned to the contentious debate over the mean-
ing of AICRA’s preamble, considering whether it supports a finding 
of intent to carry forth the “serious life impact” requirement.90  Three 
segments of the preamble formed the basis of defendant’s argument: 
Whereas, The principle underlying the philosophical basis of the 
no-fault system is that of a trade-off of one benefit for another; in 
this case, providing medical benefits in return for a limitation on 
the right to sue for non-serious injuries; and 
 
Whereas, While the Legislature believes that it is good public pol-
icy to provide medical benefits on a first party basis, without re-
gard to fault, to persons injured in automobile accidents, it rec-
ognizes that in order to keep premium costs down, the cost of the 
benefit must be offset by a reduction in the cost of other cover-
ages, most notably a restriction on the right of persons who have non-
permanent or non-serious injuries to sue for pain and suffering; and 
 
. . . . 
 
Whereas, To meet these goals, this legislation . . . provides for a 
revised lawsuit threshold for suits for pain and suffering which will 
 86 Id. at 1050–51. 
 87 Id. at 1049. 
 88 Id. at 1050. 
 89 Id. 
 90 DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1051. 
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eliminate suits for injuries which are not serious or permanent, including 
those for soft tissue injuries . . . .91
The court found this purported evidence of legislative intent to be 
“merely descriptive” of the six new categories of injury.92  “We cannot 
find a suggestion in the statute or its history that the Legislature did 
not regard the threshold injuries to be serious injuries.93  The logical 
conclusion is that the Legislature created those threshold categories 
for the purpose of denominating six classes of serious injuries.”94
Third, the court considered the Sponsors’ Statement to the sen-
ate bill ratified as AICRA.95  In the opening section, the Statement 
notes “[n]o provision in this bill is intended to repeal otherwise ap-
plicable case law.”96  The plaintiff and defendant offered conflicting 
interpretations of this statement; the plaintiff argued that the Oswin 
decision no longer falls under the category of “applicable case law” 
because AICRA is a statute separate and distinct from the 1988 Act 
considered in Oswin, while the defendant claimed it supported the 
proposition that the Legislature intended that the bill be interpreted 
consistent with the Oswin “serious life impact” standard.97  The court 
summarily dismissed the importance of the statement, noting “as with 
all extrinsic aids enlisted to divine legislative intent, a court must pro-
ceed with caution and exercise ‘controlled judgment’ in determining 
the weight that should be accorded to a sponsor’s statement.”98  Ul-
timately, the court did not afford the statement much weight, and 
concluded that when the sentence was viewed in conjunction with the 
entire paragraph, it “as a whole makes it clear that the sponsors in-
tended to replace the verbal threshold as it had existed at the time of 
Oswin with a completely new threshold.”99
 91 Id. at 1050–51 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1.1(b) (emphasis added)). 
 92 Id. at 1051. 
 93 Id. at 1052 (emphasis added). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1052; see Sponsor’s Statement, supra note 59. 
 97 DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1052–53. 
 98 Id. at 1052 (citing Deaney v. Linen Thread Co., 118 A.2d 28 (N.J. 1955)). 
 99 DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1053 (citation omitted).  The court bolstered its inter-
pretation of the Sponsor’s Statement by offering a “completely new threshold” ar-
gument, arguing that because AICRA represents a complete overhaul of the 1988 Act 
and contains several provisions not found in the 1988 Act, any construction of the 
1988 Act does not apply to AICRA.  Id. at 1053–54.  In support, the court noted that 
while the 1988 Act was clearly and indisputably based on New York automobile in-
surance law, “the Joint Committee on Automobile Insurance Reform that drafted the 
bill that became AICRA acknowledged that the source of the limitation on lawsuit 
threshold was Florida law.” Id. at 1054.  To the court, this shift from a foundation in 
New York law to Florida law was additional strong evidence that the Legislature, in 
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Finally, the court confronted the issue of the legislative intent 
and other policy considerations behind AICRA to determine whether 
they were so strong as to point to a reading of the statute other than 
the one gleaned from its express language.100  Defendants contended, 
“the Legislature must have intended to retain the serious life impact 
standard because one of AICRA’s paramount goals was to reduce the 
cost of automobile insurance” through a reduction in the number of 
litigated claims.101  Imposing a higher, serious life impact standard 
would further such a goal.  While it is indisputable that reducing the 
number of claims is a goal of AICRA, the court disagreed with this as-
sessment.102  The court urged that the limitation on lawsuit threshold 
must be viewed in light of the statute as a whole.103  Doing so reveals 
that AICRA is a detailed and comprehensive as well as multi-pronged 
the passage of AICRA, intended to distance itself from the interpretation of the 1988 
Act.  Id. 
However, from a reading of the entire Committee Report, it is clear that while 
the language of AICRA, namely the categories of injury, are similar to Florida’s (see 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(2)), the Report does not offer much evidence that they 
intended AICRA’s interpretation to be analogous to Florida law, which shows no seri-
ous life impact requirement.  In fact, the word “Florida” is only mentioned five times 
in the thirty-four page transcript of the meeting to which the court cites.  The most 
relevant excerpt from the Committee Report demonstrates this: 
SENATOR CODEY:  Jack, this essentially is the Florida language with 
teeth behind it in terms of criminal penalties, in terms of perjury or fal-
sification of the— 
SPEAKER COLLINS:  Yes.  Yes.  Using the Florida language as a base 
and also coming up with [sic] trying to tinker with some of the prob-
lems that have been shown down there and then putting real teeth into 
it, I think this is good, solid language that meets really what we were af-
ter, contracts the frivolous lawsuits — at least we believe it will — but 
also allows real cases to go forward and has a savings into [sic] it. 
See Committee Meeting of the Joint Committee on Automobile Insurance Reform, 
Deliberations with Regard to Automobile Insurance Reform, March 30, 1998, 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhearings1998.asp#JCIR. 
On the other hand, it plainly appears that what the Committee desired to 
achieve through their choice of language was to “contract [the amount of] frivolous 
lawsuits,” a goal that has been present since the inception of the verbal threshold, 
and is not new to AICRA.  Id.  Because the transcript is not dispositive as to whether 
the Legislature intended the interpretation of AICRA to be modeled after Florida law, 
the canon of statutory construction cited by the court (“a legislative enactment pat-
terned after a statute of another state is ordinarily adopted with the prior construc-
tions placed on it by the highest court of the parent jurisdiction”) is incorrectly ap-
plied in this situation.  See DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1054 (citing Oswin v. Shaw, 609 A.2d 
415 (N.J. 1992)). 
 100 DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1056. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 1056–57. 
 103 Id. 
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approach to containing the costs of automobile insurance.104  To the 
court, the limitation on lawsuit threshold presented “but one means” 
of stabilizing and reducing costs.105
VI. WHY THE “SERIOUS LIFE IMPACT” LIMITATION SHOULD BE 
RETAINED IN CLAIMS BROUGHT POST-AICRA 
A. A Pattern of Consistent Legislative Intent 
Since the inception of no-fault insurance in New Jersey in 1972, 
it is clear that while the substance of the law has changed dramati-
cally, the intent behind each of the amendments has remained the 
same—to limit lawsuits brought for non-economic damages in order 
to keep premiums both stable and affordable.106  A limitation on law-
suit clause in a no-fault insurance policy, whether it is a monetary or 
verbal threshold limitation, serves as a barrier to plaintiffs seeking to 
bring these suits.107  Allowing these suits without restriction under a 
no-fault scheme could potentially render PIP benefits unaffordable to 
many current policyholders due to the wide popularity of the limita-
tion on lawsuit option108 and also given that, presumably, people se-
lecting the limitation on lawsuit option have done so because they 
experience significant savings in insurance premiums from their elec-
tion.  The costs of litigation and the potentially high jury verdicts that 
may result would be passed on to these policyholders in the form of 
higher premiums, potentially eliminating their incentives for choos-
ing the limitation on lawsuit option. 
As previously explained, the Legislature has attempted to strike 
this balance first through a monetary threshold, and currently 
through the use of a verbal threshold.109  While the monetary thresh-
old had obvious shortcomings, the Legislature’s intent in its imple-
mentation did not.110  Imposing a minimum threshold for the 
amount of medical bills required in order to bring suit would, absent 
abuse in the form of medical bill padding, limit the amount of suits 
brought by allowing only those plaintiffs who have suffered medically 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 1056. 
 106 See discussion supra Part II. 
 107 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (providing the statutory lan-
guage and explaining the legislative intent behind the limitation on lawsuit clause). 
 108 See Worrall, supra note 40, at 104. 
 109 See discussions supra Part II and Part IV. 
 110 See discussion supra Part II. 
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significant injuries to sue for pain and suffering.111  However, as ex-
plained, the Legislature replaced the monetary with verbal because of 
medical bill padding.112  Adopted in response to this issue, the verbal 
threshold as found in the 1988 Act and AICRA was intended to stand 
as an important and significant barrier designed to limit the number 
of suits.113  The difference between the 1988 Act and AICRA was the 
method of implementation of this goal—the 1988 Act switched from 
a monetary to a verbal threshold, while AICRA sought to achieve 
similar goals by revamping the categories of injury and tacking on 
additional requirements for verbal threshold plaintiffs.114
Furthermore, the judicial interpretation of AICRA presented in 
DiProspero removes a segment of the verbal threshold barrier that has 
remained in place for over a decade, the “serious life impact” re-
quirement.115  Through its judicial implementation, the “serious life 
impact” requirement has become a central part of verbal threshold 
litigation.116  Given the long history of inclusion of the “serious life 
impact” standard and the legislative intent behind AICRA, it is rea-
sonable that the Legislature would have “expect[ed] that [the courts] 
would [have] interpret[ed] . . . [AICRA] . . . in the same manner as 
the discarded 1988 [Act].”117
This longstanding nature of Oswin’s “serious life impact” re-
quirement raises additional questions in light of the DiProspero court’s 
assertion that “the Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial 
construction of its enactments.”118  Interestingly, the DiProspero court 
offered this canon of statutory interpretation to support the opposite 
conclusion—that the Legislature must not have intended to preserve 
the Oswin standard when it created AICRA because presuming their 
awareness of Oswin’s interpretation, it chose to expressly adopt cer-
tain aspects of former verbal threshold case law, but excluded the 
Oswin standard from AICRA.119  However, the DiProspero court’s rea-
soning lends itself to an equally persuasive counterargument—the 
Legislature, presumed to be aware of the Oswin interpretation of the 
1988 Act, never objected or moved to amend the statute to specifi-
 111 See id. 
 112 See id. 
 113 See N.J. STAT. ANN. 39:6A-1.1(b) (West 2002) (stating expressly in the Preamble 
that AICRA is intended to limit suits for nonserious injuries). 
 114 See discussion supra Part II. 
 115 See DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1056. 
 116 See discussion supra Part II. 
 117 DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1050. 
 118 Id. at 1049. 
 119 See supra note 99. 
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cally exclude a “serious life impact” requirement during the thirteen 
years in which Oswin’s interpretation stood.  Such “reverse” selective-
incorporation, which arguably represents Legislative acquiescence to 
Oswin, holds just as much weight as DiProspero’s selective incorpora-
tion argument, yet reaches the opposite conclusion. 
This continuity and clarity of legislative intent cannot be ig-
nored; a reading of the verbal threshold standard that makes is easier 
for a plaintiff to bring suit for non-economic damages runs counter 
to the legislative purpose of AICRA and its predecessors.120  Even the 
Legislature itself has recognized the problems presented by the 
DiProspero decision; in fact, several amendments have recently been 
proposed in both the state Assembly and Senate that move to rein-
state the “serious life impact” requirement in verbal threshold litiga-
tion.121  In accordance with good policy, the “serious life impact” 
standard should thus be reinstated.122
B. Prior Judicial Construction of the Issue Presented in DiProspero 
Earlier decisions from the New Jersey Appellate Division relied 
on the weight and clarity of the legislative intent behind New Jersey’s 
no-fault laws in holding that the serious life impact standard was in-
tended to be carried forward to suits brought post-AICRA.123  That 
 120 See N.J. STAT. ANN. 39:6A-1.1(b) (West 2002) (stating expressly that AICRA is 
intended to limit suits for non-serious injuries). 
 121 See supra note 29. 
 122 See 73 AM. JUR. 2D  Statutes § 61 (2005) (explaining the effect of legislature's in-
tent, objectives, and purposes in statutory interpretation): 
In the interpretation of statutes, the legislative will is the all-important or 
controlling factor.  Indeed, it is sometimes stated in effect that the inten-
tion of the legislature constitutes the law. Accordingly, the primary rule 
of construction of statutes is to ascertain and declare the intention of 
the legislature, and to carry such intention into effect to the fullest de-
gree. Thus, a construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, de-
stroy, or defeat the intention of the legislature. (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted). 
See also 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 62 (2005) (describing the relation of general rules of 
construction to determination of legislative intent): 
In the interpretation of a statute, the intention of the legislature is 
gathered from the provisions enacted, by the application of sound and 
well-settled canons of construction.  However, since all rules for the in-
terpretation of statutes of doubtful meaning have for their sole object 
the discovery of the legislative intent, every technical rule as to the construc-
tion of a statute must yield to the expression of the paramount will of the legisla-
ture. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 123 See, e.g. James v. Torres, 808 A.2d 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 2002), cert. de-
nied, 816 A.2d 1049 (N.J. 2003); Rios v. Szivos, 808 A.2d 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2002). 
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the New Jersey Appellate Division has reached the conclusion oppo-
site of DiProspero, combined with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s de-
nials of certification on the issue until the year 2005, is further evi-
dence that the court in DiProspero erred in its conclusion.124  In James 
v. Torres,125 a plaintiff subject to the verbal threshold suffered injuries 
in an automobile accident and sought recovery for her resulting non-
economic damages.126  The trial judge dismissed her case because her 
injuries were not shown to have a serious impact on her life.127  Plain-
tiff appealed, arguing that the Legislature did not intend to carry 
forward Oswin’s “serious life impact” standard, stressing that AICRA 
omits any mention of such a requirement.128  The court disagreed, 
emphasizing the weight to be given to the legislative purpose129 and 
noting that plaintiff’s interpretation would undermine that purpose: 
the entire thrust behind the passage of AICRA was to reduce the 
number of litigated claims and, thus, to bring stability to automo-
bile insurance premiums. If courts were to permit claims to go 
forward even in the absence of proof of a serious impact on a 
plaintiff’s life, it would run counter to this legislative purpose . . . 
[because] . . . with more lawsuits comes higher costs.130
Similarly, in Rios v. Szivos,131 the court concluded, mirroring the 
reasoning of the New Jersey Law Division’s decision in Rogozinski v. 
Turs,132 that “[b]ecause AICRA reflects an intention to ‘tighten’ the 
threshold and further restrict lawsuits arising from automobile acci-
dents,” the Legislature did not intend that AICRA dispose of the cen-
 124 See James, 808 A.2d 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 875. 
 127 Id. at 876. 
 128 Id. 
 129 “[I]n the absence of specific guidance, our task is to discern the intent of the 
Legislature not only from the terms of the Act, but also from its structure, history and 
purpose.”  James, 808 A.2d at 878 (internal quotations omitted)(citing Jiminez v. 
Baglieri, 704 A.2d 1285,1290 (N.J. 1998)).  Ultimately, the court stated that “it is not 
the words but the internal sense of the law that controls.”  James, 808 A.2d at 878 (em-
phasis added)(internal quotations omitted)(citing Jiminez v. Baglieri, 704 A.2d 
1285,1290 (N.J. 1998))  The court continued to define the proper sources of legisla-
tive intent—“the policy behind the statute, concepts of reasonableness and legislative 
history . . . it is a general principle of statutory construction that ‘statutes are to be 
read sensibly rather than literally and the controlling legislative intent is to be pre-
sumed as consonant to reason and good discretion.’”  James, 808 A.2d at 879 (quot-
ing Parker v. Esposito, 677 A.2d 1159, 1162 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 130 James, 808 A.2d at 878 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
 131 808 A.2d 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
 132 799 A.2d 41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002). 
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tral holding of Oswin.133  Confronted with the same issue, the court in 
Rogozinski specifically stated “the Legislature’s stated purpose is the 
key to the interpretation of any law.”134  Even though AICRA may 
have amended the 1988 Act, the purposes had remained the same, 
which to the court “d[id] not reflect an intention to modify the es-
sential holdings of Oswin.”135
C. AICRA: Multi-Pronged, But Maybe Not Multi-Protective 
DiProspero placed great weight on the fact that AICRA contains 
several other provisions other than its version of the verbal threshold 
aimed at containing the costs of automobile insurance.136  The court 
pointed to the creation of the Office of the Insurance Fraud Investi-
gator, the implementation of the medical certification requirement, 
and the “tightening” of the verbal threshold through an overhaul to 
the categories of injury.137  The court concluded that the existence of 
these additional protective measures eliminates the need for another 
protective measure—the “serious life impact” standard.138  Under a 
closer examination, AICRA’s new measures may not be sufficiently 
“protective” or effective in reducing the costs of insurance so as to 
support the abandonment of the serious life impact requirement—a 
hurdle to too many verbal threshold suits. 
The weakest of the new “prongs” aimed at reducing the cost of 
insurance seems to be the new threshold itself,139 lending further 
support to the carryover of the “serious life impact” requirement.  It 
appears that the new threshold has not been “tightened” to the ex-
tent that the DiProspero court believes.140  While AICRA did revamp 
the categories of injury to eliminate suits based on non-permanent 
injuries, it is possible that the number of future claims eliminated by 
these changes could be negated by an increase in claims based on 
 133 Rios, 808 A.2d at 869 (quoting Rogozinski, 799 A.2d at 49). 
 134 Rogozinski, 799 A.2d at 48.  The same issue has been considered in the New Jer-
sey Law Division, with some cases reaching the opposite result.  See, e.g., Compere v. 
Collins, 799 A.2d 721 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002) (offering a “completely new 
threshold” argument and refusing to rely on extrinsic aids to determine the legisla-
tive intent because the language of AICRA is clear and unambiguous). 
 135 Rogozinski, 799 A.2d at 49. 
 136 DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 1039, 1046–47(N.J. 2005). 
 137 Id. at 1047. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(1) (West 2005) (presenting the language of 
AICRA’s verbal threshold). 
 140 Compare 1988 NJ Sess. Law Serv. 119 (West) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(1) 
(West 2002). 
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permanent, non-serious injuries.141  AICRA’s definition of “perma-
nent” does not speak to the seriousness of the injury; it merely re-
quires that the injury not heal to function normally with further 
medical treatment.142  Previously, claims based on permanent, non-
serious injuries would have been dismissed on summary judgment for 
failure to vault the threshold; hence, the “new” threshold appears to 
create a sort of “trade-off” by eliminating suits for non-permanent in-
juries and replacing them with suits for permanent, non-serious inju-
ries.143
Similarly, the physician certification requirement does not ap-
pear to be a strong factor in containing the cost of insurance.  This 
requirement, while new in terms of language, is not new to New Jer-
sey in practice.  The court in Oswin, as part of a three-part holding, 
required that the plaintiff submit objective, credible evidence to at-
test to the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injury.144  Notwithstand-
ing the absence of a clause in the statute stating that a doctor would 
be subjected to penalties for fraudulent reports, those who submit 
such false reports would always be subject to penalties for perjury.  
The codification of this punishment cannot alone be enough to limit 
the number of suits brought.  This, combined with the problems pre-
sented by the new verbal threshold, create enough doubt as to the ef-
fectiveness of AICRA’s “new multi-pronged approach” to undermine 
the conclusion that the Oswin “serious life impact” requirement is no 
longer needed. 
VII.     CONCLUSION 
The New Jersey Supreme Court’s elimination of Oswin’s “serious 
life impact” requirement in DiProspero v. Penn has the potential to 
open the courthouse to an increased number of verbal threshold 
suits and appeals.145  While this presents an issue of concern in itself, 
the decision in DiProspero is also troubling in that it runs contrary to 
 141 AICRA’s definition of permanent does not include a seriousness element.  A 
permanent, non-serious injury could be something that does not affect the daily life 
of the person, but it still “permanent.”  Before, this type of injury would have been 
regarded as frivolous, and related suits would be disallowed.  See discussion supra Part 
III. 
 142 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(1) (2005). 
 143 See Henry Gottlieb, Lawyers Seeing Fewer Trials and Less of Each Other, NEW JERSEY 
LAW JOURNAL, Oct. 3, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
article.jsp?id=1127811911612 (noting that prior to the decision in DiProspero, the 
number of cases was actually declining and highlighting the potential fallout from the 
decision in terms of the number of cases on the docket and the expected increase). 
 144 Oswin v. Shaw, 609 A.2d 415, 429 (N.J. 1992). 
 145 See Gottlieb, supra note 143. 
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the consistent legislative intent behind New Jersey’s latest construc-
tion of its no-fault automobile insurance statute, AICRA.146  Examin-
ing New Jersey’s history of no-fault auto insurance illustrates that a 
central goal of the Legislature has consistently been to reduce the 
number of suits in order to keep insurance premiums affordable—
whether it be through a monetary or verbal threshold limitation.147  
By eliminating the long-standing standard set out in Oswin, the court 
in DiProspero has removed an important limitation on lawsuits, which 
had remained unaltered by the Legislature for nearly thirteen 
years.148  An increase in the number of suits may have the effect of 
rendering unaffordable automobile insurance premiums, contrary to 
the legislative intent behind AICRA and its predecessors.  While it 
may be too early to feel the effects of the decision, recently proposed 
amendments to reinstate Oswin’s requirements149 illustrate the grow-
ing awareness of the problems that the DiProspero decision may cause. 
 
 146 See discussion supra Part VI. 
 147 See id. 
 148 See discussion supra Part V. 
 149 See sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
